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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
explain a person's presence on a waterfront facility than to show extrinsic
circumstances tending to prove lawful possession of a penknife.
It is apparent from this discussion that in some instances the courts may
be able to apply the rules as to vagueness, overbroadness and abuse of the
police power to the same set of facts. The courts may also apply some of the
rules to the exclusion of the others where all of them could apply. In most cases
the tendency is to attack the most obvious defect in the statute, rather than
discuss all the possible reasons for invalidity. Of course, in some of these cases
there will be no unanimous agreement as to what the paramount defect is.
M. A. L.

CONTRACTS
NEW PROMISE MADE UPON PAST CONSIDERATION NOT ENFORCEABLE

In Arden v. Freydberg,l an insurance agent, at the request of defendants,
devised and submitted a plan for corporate life insurance policies to defendants'
corporation. Subsequent to the submission of the plan defendants orally
promised plaintiff that the policies would be written by him. The plan as
prepared by plaintiff was adopted by defendants' corporation, but the insurance
was written through an employee of the corporation who was made an insurance
agent for that sole purpose. Plaintiff brought an action for damages in an
amount equal to the commissions and renewal commissions he would have
received, if defendants had placed the plan with him.
The trial court's judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the Appellate
Division.2 The Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision affirming the Appellate
Division, stated that the oral promises made by the defendants subsequent to
submission of the plan by plaintiff did not afford adequate consideration to
create an enforceable contract. Consideration which consists of services already
performed is generally held to be insufficient to support a promise.,,
The majority found that at the time the request was made by defendants,
there was no accompanying promise, express or implied, to obtain the insurance
from the plaintiff. Therefore, in the opinion of the majority, if a contract was
created, one could be found only on the defendants' subsequent promises, which
were not binding because they were supported by past consideration.
The dissent took the view that the conduct of the parties from the initial
request to the final acceptance disclosed the creation of a unilateral contract. 4
At the time the request for the submission of the plans was made, a promise to
place the insurance with plaintiff could be implied. The performance by
1.

9 N.Y.2d 393, 214 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1961).

2. 11 A.D.2d 1, 201 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1961).
3. Axelrod v. 77 Park Ave. Corp., 225 App. Div. 557, 234 N.Y. Supp. 27 (1st Dep't
1929); Blanshan v. Russell, 32 App. Div. 103, 52 N.Y. Supp. 963 (3d Dep't 1898), aft'd, 161
N.Y. 629, 55 N.E. 1093 (1899).

4.

On unilateral contract, see 33 Colum. L. Rev. 463 (1933).
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plaintiff, i.e., a plan which was acceptable, would provide the consideration for
the contract.
By imposing on the defendants an implied promise to obtain insurance from
the plaintiff, if his plans were acceptable, from the initial request of the
defendants, the dissent did what the majority had refused to do. This implied
obligation, once established, enabled the dissent to acquire vast legal support
for its decision. 5 The majority, unlike the dissent, was not willing to imply a
promise to pay the plaintiff for his services, since the negotiations between the
parties had not passed the informal stage. To imply a promise to pay on the
basis of informal conversations between friends would, according to the
majority, create a new and undesirable type of contract liability.
In Blanshan v. Russell,6 the only case cited by the majority in the case at
bar, it was held that services rendered by a woman to a man to whom she was
engaged to be married, without any idea of being paid therefor, are no
consideration for subsequent assurances by defendant that plaintiff would be
paid. In the instant case, one can be reasonably certain that an insurance agent,
whose livelihood is dependent upon his commissions from the sale of insurance,
would expect compensation for his services if his plans were acceptable. The
Blanshan case can be distinguished from the instant case because there was
probably no intent by the insurance agent to offer his services gratuitously, and
the dissent was undoubtedly correct in implying a promise from the initial
request for an insurance plan.
L. H. S.
OFFICER NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE ON CORPORATE CONTRACT NOTWITHSTANDING CLAUSE TO THE CONTRARY

In Salzman Sign Co. v. Beck,7 the plaintiff contracted with the Leslie 575
Corporation, of which defendant's intestate was president, for the purchase of
an advertising sign. Paragraph five of the printed-form contract stipulated that
where the purchaser was a corporation, the officer signing on behalf of the
corporation "hereby personally guarantee [s] the payments hereinabove provided
for." The signature for the purchasing corporation appeared thusly: "Leslie
575 Corp. L.S.[,] Irving Beck pres L.S.." Plaintiff sued defendant- for the
balance due on the contract.
The trial court held for the defendant on the ground that there was no
clear indication that Beck intended to be bound personally. The Appellate
Term affirmed, granting the defendant summary judgment and dismissing the
complaint. The Appellate Division, in affirming,8 granted leave to appeal to
the Court of Appeals, which in affirmance held that the contract executed and
5. See Hedemann v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 286 N.Y. 240, 36 N.E.2d 129 (1941);
Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 284 N.Y. 32, 29 N.E.2d 458 (1941); Willetts v.
The Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 45 N.Y. 45 (1871).
6. Blansban v. Russell, supra note 3.
7.
8.

10 N.Y.2d 63, 217 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1961).
11 A.D.2d 1068, 206 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1961).
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